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HUNTING RIGHTS: RETENTION OF TREATY RIGHTS
AFTER TERMINATION-Kimball v. Callahan'
Mary Pearson
Introduction
Plaintiffs, who were Klamath Indians terminated from federal super-
vision by act of Congress2 who had elected to withdraw from the
tribe,3 sought a declaratory judgment in federal court of their right to
hunt, trap, and fish on their ancestral reservation 4 free of the state of
Oregon's fish and game regulations. The lower court denied relief and
dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals held that Indians
terminated from federal supervision pursuant to the Klamath Ter-
mination Act,5 and even those who elected to withdraw from the
tribe,6 nevertheless retain treaty hunting, trapping, and fishing rights,
free from the control and regulation of the state of Oregon, on
the lands constituting United States national forest land and that
privately owned land on which hunting, trapping, or fishing is
permitted.
The Kimball case appears to have far-reaching effects not only for
terminated Indians, but also for those tribes whose reservations have
been reduced in size. In a recent case out of Washington state,7 the
Supreme Court held that Colville tribal members had the right to
hunt and fish on former reservation lands that had been severed from
the present reservation.8 The severance agreement provided expressly
that "the right to hunt and fish in common with all other persons on
lands not allotted to said Indians shall not be taken away or in any-
wise abridged." The Washington Supreme Court opinion construed
the agreement as a mere promise by the United States that so long
as the United States retained any ceded land and allowed others to
hunt there, Indians would be allowed to hunt there also. But the
Supreme Court declared that congressional ratification of the sever-
ance agreement must be construed to exempt the Indians from like
state control or Congress would have preserved nothing which the
Indians would not have had without that legislation. The Court
found that state qualification of hunting and fishing rights is pre-
cluded by force of the supremacy clause, and neither an expressed
provision precluding state qualification nor the consent of the state
was required to achieve that result.10
Treaty and Statutes
One hundred and ten years ago the United States made a treaty
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with the Klamath and Modoac [Modoc] tribes and Yahooskin Band
of Snake Indians, in which the Indians ceded certain lands to the
United States in return for $115,000 to be paid over a 15-year period
and other services.1' Included in the treaty was a provision that
"certain land within the country ceded by this treaty, shall . . . be
set apart as a residence for said Indians, [and] held and regarded as
an Indian reservation, .. 12 The treaty prohibited white persons
from living on the reservation and reserved to the Indians "the
exclusive right of taking fish in the streams and lakes, included in
said reservation,. .-
Control over Indian conduct was reserved to Congress by the
supremacy clause.14 In 1953, Congress, by Public Law No. 83-280,
granted certain states civil and criminal jurisdiction "over offenses
committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian Country.'
In the case of Oregon, this land is described as "[a]ll Indian country
within the State, except the Warm Springs Reservation."'" Public
Law 280 provided further that
Nothing in this section . . . shall deprive any Indian or any
Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege, or im-
munity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with
respect to hunting, trapping or fishing or the control, licensing, or
regulation thereof.' 7
Less than one year later and almost 90 years to the day after the
signing of the treaty with the Klamaths, the same Congress that
passed Public Law 28o passed the Klamath Termination Act,'8 a
bill to terminate all federal supervision over the Klamath, Modoc,
and Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians.'9 Two sections of the Klam-
ath Termination Act became bones of contention between the state
and the tribe, Section 564m(b) 20 dealing with water and fishing
rights, and Section 564w21 dealing with the taking of the land itself.
From this conflict came several Indian rights suits. 22
Oregon Cases Leading Up To Kimball
In 1956, the Klamath, Modoc, and Yahooskin Band of Snake
Indians (also known collectively as the Klamath Tribe) and nine
individual members of the tribe, as owners of the hunting and
trapping rights, privileges, and immunities within the area of aborig-
inal domain reserved to the Klamath Tribe by the Treaty of 1864,23
filed suit against the state of Oregon.2 4 The provisions of Public Law
28o formed the basis of the state's defense. Following the adoption of
Public Law 280 in 1953, the state had repeatedly threatened to arrest
122
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol4/iss1/9
members of the tribe and confiscate their guns, sights, traps, and
other equipment because such members failed to conform to Oregon
laws respecting season, species, sex, or bag limit.2 5 In this federal
district court decision, Judge Solomon found in favor of the Indians
after tracing methods of hunting and trapping from aboriginal times
to modem days, including species of animal hunted and trapped and
methods used. The court held that Public Law 28o did not extend
the hunting and trapping laws of the state of Oregon to the Klamath
Indian Reservation.27
In 1956, the Klamath Termination Act had not yet gone into
effect. It became effective in 1961.28 In 1964, the tribe lost the
measure of legal security that had been gained in 1956, when remain-
ing members of the tribe were forced to seek a declaration of their
right to hunt and trap free from state regulation and control on
forest lands taken by the United States pursuant to Section 564w of
the Klamath Termination Act.29 The state maintained that the
Klamath Termination Act and the manner in which it had been
carried out 3° resulted in the loss of plaintiffs' treaty rights within the
former reservation. 31
The Klamaths argued that their right to hunt and trap free from
state control was conferred by the treaty of 1864; that while Con-
gress has the power to abrogate such treaty rights, it will not be
assumed to have done so in the absence of express language;32 and
that there is nothing in the Klamath Termination Act limiting their
right to hunt and trap upon lands assigned to them by treaty.33 The
Indians argued that since their fishing rights were preserved in the
Termination Act, that by judicial construction their hunting and
trapping rights are coextensive with their fishing rights.34 The district
court disagreed and said that plaintiffs had lost their treaty hunting
and trapping rights along with the former reservation.35
The United States, in an amicus curiae brief, expressed the view
that with the Termination Act and the many other termination acts
of the 195o's and 196o's,36 it was conclusively demonstrated that
Congress intended to amalgamate the Indians with the rest of the
population and not accord them special treatment.3 7 The govern-
ment argued that the purpose of the Klamath Termination Act was
to (1 ) end federal supervision, (2) remove from Indians their special
status as Indians, and (3) make state laws applicable to them in the
same manner as they apply to other citizens.38 This position prevailed
on appeal and the lower court's decision was affirmed.39
The court of appeals held that if Section 564m(b) preserved to
the Indians fishing rights and privileges to the extent previously en-
joyed, it had done so by express statutory grant of rights which the
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Indians could not have claimed because their rights were limited to
the reservation land under the treaty.40 The court concluded by inter-
preting Congress' intent to clearly limit the application of the section
to fishing alone.41
The Menominee Cases
Similar issues were being litigated in Wisconsin at the same time
by the Menominee Tribe which had also been terminated in 1954.42
State v. Sanipaw43 was a criminal prosecution of three enrolled mem-
bers of the Menominee Tribe for alleged violation of certain game
laws. The trial court held in favor of the Indians and the state ap-
pealed the decision.44 The Wisconsin Supreme Court referred to the
language of the Termination Act that "the laws of the several States
shall apply to the tribe in the same manner as they apply to other
citizens or persons within their jurisdiction, 45 and concluded that
"the Termination Act abrogates any right to be free of the state's
game laws in exercising hunting rights over the former tribal lands
of the reservation. 46
After the adverse decision in State v. Sanipaw,47 the Menominee
felt that if they had lost their hunting and fishing rights, they should
be compensated for that loss and sued the United States in the Court
of Claims.48 The government challenged the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims and contended that the Menominee Termination
Act" abolished the Menominee Tribe of Indians. The Court of
Claims disagreed.50
Two issues presented in this case were whether the Menominee
Tribe had exclusive and unregulated hunting and fishing rights on
the Wolf River Reservation, and if so, whether the Menominee
Termination Act abrogated or cancelled those rights.51 The court
answered the first in the affirmative, based on the fact that at the time
of the 1854 treaty, hunting and fishing was a way of life with the
Menominee and cited the 1956 Klamath case as support.5 2
In dealing with the possibility of the Termination Act abrogating
those rights, the court compared the Menominee and Klamath Ter-
mination acts. The Menominee Act, unlike the Klamath Termina-
tion Act, did not mention hunting and fishing rights. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court in State v. Sanipaw, 3 had construed language in the
Act to cut off unregulated hunting and fishing rights and made the
Menominee Tribe subject to the game laws of Wisconsin. The Court
of Claims looked to the legislative history and found two reasons why
Congress had not preserved and protected hunting and fishing rights
in the Menominee Termination Act itself:5 4
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(1) They were preserved and protected in Public Law 28o and
two other termination bills considered by Congress, but not passed.
Both of those bills contained language practically identical to that
in Public Law 28o preserving hunting and fishing rights. The court
concluded that Congress had decided it was unnecessary to preserve
hunting and fishing rights in both the Termination Act and Public
Law 28o.'
(2) It was unnecessary to preserve hunting and fishing fights in
the Termination Act because by the terms of the Act the tribe was
to submit a plan to the Secretary of the Interior "... . for the protec-
tion of the water, soil, fish, and wild life."6 The Termination Act
was to become effective when the Secretary had issued and published
a proclamation containing the plan submitted by the tribe, along
with the Secretary's approval of the plan1 7
The Court of Claims referred again to the 1956 Klamath district
court decision, 8 which stated that hunting and fishing rights were
specifically recognized by Congress in Public Law 28o and that the
members of the tribe had a right to hunt and trap on the reservation
without restriction or control by the state of Oregon. 9
The court agreed with plaintiffs' argument that "to be held as
Indian lands are held" 60 grants to the Indians the unqualified right
to hunt and fish on the reservation in the Indians' own way, free from
all outside regulation and control.6' The Menominee Termination
Act did not abrogate the exclusive hunting and fishing rights but
actually preserved and protected them. The court felt that the Wis-
consin Supreme Court might have reached a different decision if it
had had the benefit of all the facts and circumstances surrounding
Public Law 280. The Court of Claims held that Menominees who
are enrolled members of the tribe, on its records, own and possess at
the present time the exclusive right to hunt and fish on their reserva-
tion free from restriction, regulation, or control by the state of Wis-
consin,6 and dismissed the petition of the Menominee against the
United States for failing to state a cause of action. The Court of
Claims further held that action of the state in interfering with rights
of the Indians was not action which made the United States liable,
leaving the Menominee in a state of legal limbo.63
The dilemma was solved when the suit came before the United
States Supreme Court on writ of certiorari.6 The Supreme Court
agreed with the Court of Claims that the language, "to be held as
Indian lands are held," includes the right to hunt and fish, even
though the 1854 treaty was silent about hunting and fishing rights. 65
Dealing with the ambiguity between the 1848 and 1854 treaties, the
Court quoted from United States v. Winans6 which said: "[W]e
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will construe a treaty with the Indians as 'that unlettered people'
understood it, and as justice and reason demand, in all cases where
power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care and
protection....
In discussing the legislative history of the Menominee Termina-
tion Act, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Claims that
the amendment to Public Law 280 two months after the Termina-
tion Act was passed, although granting Wisconsin jurisdiction over
"all Indian country within the State,"68 went on to protect Indian
treaty rights.
In discussing Public Law 280, Justice Douglas, in his majority
opinion, said, "[t]hat provision on its face contains no limitation; it
protects any hunting, trapping, or fishing right granted by a federal
treaty."6 Public Law 280, as amended, became law in 1954, when
the Menominee Reservation was still "Indian country" within the
meaning of that law, and nearly seven years before the Termination
Act became fully effective in 1961.°
The Supreme Court determined that the Termination Act and
Public Law 28o must be considered in pari materia.71 The Court
concluded that although federal supervision of the tribe was to cease
and all tribal property was to be transferred to new hands, the hunting
and fishing rights granted or preserved by the 1854 treaty survived
the Termination Act of 1954.2 The use of the word "statute" in the
Termination Act was considered potent evidence that Congress had
no treaty in mind and the Court felt that this construction was in
accord with the overall legislative plan.73
The Court declined to construe the Termination Act as a back-
handed way of abrogating the hunting and fishing rights of the In-
dians.74 "While the power to abrogate those rights exists"3 . . .the
intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed
to the Congress. 76
The Court buttressed its conclusion by looking at Congress' intent.
Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah, the senator chiefly responsible for
pushing the Termination Acts to enactment, remarked at the signing
of the bill, that it "in no way violates any treaty obligation with this
tribe. ' 77 The Court found it difficult to believe Congress would
subject the United States to a claim for compensation by destroying
property rights conferred by treaty, particularly at a time when Con-
gress was attempting to settle the government's financial obligation
toward the Indians by the Termination Acts, and it affirmed the
Court of Claims.7 8
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Kimball v. Callahan
In 1973, four members who had withdrawn from the Klamath
Tribe attempted to assert exemption from state game laws in state
court.70 Defendants had been prosecuted and convicted of illegal
possession of deer killed on former reservation land.80
Defendant Indians argued that Menominee Tribe v. United
States,"' which held that tribal hunting and fishing rights guaranteed
by treaty may be abrogated only by explicit legislation, overruled the
1964 KIamath decision. 2 The state appellate court distinguished
Menominee Tribe v. United States8 3 and said it did not apply because
the court was not dealing here with either the Klamath Tribe or its
members but those persons who have elected to withdraw from the
tribe and ceased to be members, with the single exception of sharing
in proceeds of tribal claims against the United States.'- The court
concluded by saying that when the issue is who shall be beneficiaries
of federal treaties, then Congress had the ultimate authority to
determine tribal membership.8 5
The court of appeals further held that whatever rights, if any,
enrolled members might retain to hunt on former reservation lands,
such rights did not extend to nonmembers, including defendants,
and defendants enjoyed no immunity from state game laws.86
On rehearing, the court of appeals held that remaining members
of the Klamath Tribe did not have hunting and trapping rights on
the former reservation land, that they had no right to assign such
rights to persons who were not members of the tribe, and the petition
for rehearing was denied. 7
In Kimball,8 plaintiffs were five Klamath Indians who withdrew
from the Klamath Tribe. With the exception of the plaintiffs being
withdrawn members of the tribe, two issues presented were identical
with Menominee Tribe v. United States,89 the first being whether
the treaty was correctly interpreted to include hunting and trapping
rights, and the second whether these rights survived the Klamath
Termination Act.9 0
Judge Solomon, who decided the 1956 Klamath case in favor of
the tribe, denied a request for declaratory judgment and dismissed
the complaint."- On appeal the court discussed Menominee Tribe v.
United States92 and the construction of the treaty language and
found that the language "... . set apart as a residence for said Indians
and held and regarded as an Indian reservation," also includes the
right to hunt and fish. 3 The fact that the specific treaty provision
reserved to the Klamaths the exclusive right to fish was not consid-
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ered to exclude hunting and trapping in light of the highly significant
role that hunting and trapping play in the lives of the Klamaths. The
court stated that it seemed unlikely that the tribe would have know-
ingly relinquished these rights at the time of entering into the treaty94
and again cited Menominee Tribe95 and State v. Sanipawv06 The court
in Kimball cited the 1956 Klamath 6 Modoc Tribes v. Maison
decision, 97 which had held that the Klamath Tribe had enjoyed these
rights for almost Loo years with the consent and acquiesence of the
state of Oregon 8 This led to the conclusion that the treaty pro-
vides exclusive rights to hunt and trap, as well as fish, free of state
regulation.19
Defendants argued that Menominee Tribe v. United States"'0 is
distinguishable because of significant differences between the Me-
nominee and Klamath Termination Acts. The Menominee had no
option, as did the Klamath,' 0' to withdraw from the tribe and receive
the money value of their interest, although each member of the tribe
on the final roll received payment of $1,500.102 The Menominees con-
tinued to occupy the same land before and after termination, al-
though title to the land changed hands. 103 The disputed land in
Kimball is no longer legally occupied by the Klamath. The court
found that the conclusions of Menominee Tribe v. United States"0 4
were applicable despite these distinctions. 05
The court of appeals said that the reasoning in Menominee
Tribe' may be even more compelling in the case of Kimball because
Senator Watkins at hearings on the bill suggested that the govern-
ment "buy out" the Indians' hunting and fishing rights rather than
preserve them after termination.07 The Klamath Termination Act
provides that withdrawn members of the tribe relinquish their inter-
ests in tribal property, 08 but treaty rights are rights of individual
Indians.109 Although defendants also cited the 1964 Ninth Circuit
Klamath casel" as authority for their position, the court of appeals
held,
This reasoning cannot stand in light of Menominee Tribe. It is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's requirements that Con-
gress clearly indicate when it intends to abrogate treaty rights.
Moreover, it is inconsistent with the Court's construction of Public
Law 280 that treaty rights with respect to hunting, trapping, or
fishing survive the Termination Acts to the extent that they attach
to land known as "Indian country" at the time Public Law 28o
became effective.
Congress not only failed to indicate clearly an intent to abrogate
treaty rights; it in fact expressly preserved at least fishing rights on
the former reservation .... ill
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Defendants further argued that Section 564m (b) of the Termina-
tion Act cannot aid plaintiffs because they are no longer "members"
of the tribe. The court of appeals rejected this argument because the
Act provides that nothing shall abrogate treaty fishing rights"12 and
concluded that a Klamath Indian possessing treaty rights on the
former reservation at the time of the Termination Act retains those
rights, even though he relinquishes his tribal membership or the
reservation shrinks pursuant to the Act.113 The court declared that
plaintiffs may exercise their treaty hunting, trapping, and fishing
free of state fish and game regulations on the lands of their ancestral
Klamath Indian Reservation, including that land now constituting
United States national forest land and that privately owned land on
which hunting, trapping, or fishing is permitted.114
On February Lo, 1976, at the United States District Courthouse
in Portland, Oregon, Senior Judge Gus J. Solomon heard one and
one-half hours of argument in a suit brought by five Klamath Indians
against the state of Oregon. A ruling in this case in which the
Klamath Indians challenged the right of the state to regulate hunting
and fishing on the former Klamath Indian Reservation will come
sometime after March 2o. Judge Solomon permitted the United
States Department of Justice to enter the case as a friend of the court
and gave federal attorneys until February 2o to file a brief. No testi-
mony was heard in court as attorneys submitted statements from
their witnesses and agreed to accept without cross-examination the
testimony of the other side. The ruling on this case may well support
the contention expressed earlier-Kimball v. Callahan indeed has
far-reaching effects.
NOTES
1. 493 F.2d 564 (9 th Cir. 3974).
2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 5 6 4-564w (1970).
3. 25 U.S.C. § 564 d(2) (1970); Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 388 F.2d
62o, 622 ( 9th Cir. 1964).
4. Treaty of Oct. 14, 1864.
5. 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564w (1970).
6. 25 U.S.C. § 564 d(2) (1970).
7. Antone v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975).
8. Agreement May i9, 1891, with ratifying legislation by Act of July 3, 1892, and
Act of June 21, 19o6.
9. Antone v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 196 (1975).
3o. Id. at 194.
:u. Treaty of Oct. 14, 1864.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1976
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (Supp. 1976). "Indian Country" is (a) all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States govern-
ment, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of
the United States, . . . (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same." 18 U.S.C. §
1151 (1966).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (Supp. 1976).
17. Id.
18. 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564w (1966).
19. 25 U.S.C. § 564 (1966). "The purpose of sections 564 to 564w of this title is
to provide for the termination of Federal supervision over the trust and restricted
property of the Klamath Tribe of Indians consisting of the Klamath and Modoc Tribes
and the Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians, and of the individual members thereof, for
the disposition of federally owned property acquired or withdrawn for the administra-
tion of the affairs of said Indians, and for a termination of Federal services furnished
such Indians because of their status as Indians."
20. 25 U.S.C. § 564 m(b) (1966): "Nothing in sections 564 to 564W-1 of this
title shall abrogate any fishing rights or privileges of the tribe or the members thereof
enjoyed under Federal treaty."
21. 25 U.S.C. § 564w (1966). The Act provides for a taking by the United States
of all tribal lands within the Klamath Indian forest which had not been sold by April
1, 1961.
22. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564 (9 th Cir. 1974); Klamath & Modoc Tribes
v. Maison, 338 F.2d 620 (9 th Cir. 1964); Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 139
F. Supp. 634 (D. Ore. 1956); State v. Bojorcas, 14 Ore. App. 538, 514 P.zd 566
(1973); State v. Bojorcas, 14 Ore. App. 446, 513 P.zd 813 (1973).
z3. 16 Stat. 707.
z4. Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 139 F. Supp. 634 (D. Ore. 1956).
25. Id. at 637.
26. Id. at 636-37.
27. Id.
28. 71 Stat. 347 (codified in scattered sections of § 564, 25 U.S.C. (1964).
29. Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 338 F.2d 620 (9 th Cir. 1964).
30. 25 U.S.C. § 5 64d(2) (1966). "Each member of the tribe is given an oppor-
tunity 'to elect to withdraw from the tribe and have his interest in tribal property
converted into money and paid to him,' or to remain in the tribe and participate in
the tribal management plan to be prepared, pursuant to paragraph (5) of this sub-
section."
31. Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 338 F.2d 6zo, 621-23 ( 9th Cir. 1964).
32. Id. at 621.
33- Id. at 622.
34. Id. at 623.
35. Id. at 622.
36. Termination of Federal Supervision: 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564w (1954) (Klamath
Tribe in 1970); 25 U.S.C. §§ 677-677aa (1954) (Ute Tribe in 1970); 25 U.S.C. §§
691-7o8 (1954) (Western Oregon Indians in 1970); 25 U.S.C. §§ 721-28 (1954)
(Alabama & Coushatta Tribe of Texas in 1970); 25 U.S.C. §§ 741-6o (1954) (Paiute
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol4/iss1/9
Indians of Utah in 1970); 25 U.S.C. §§ 791-807 (1956) (Wyandotte Indians in
1970); 25 U.S.C. §§ 821-26 (1956) (Peoria Indians in 1970); 25 U.S.C §§ 841-53
(1956) (Ottawa Tribe of Indians in 1970); 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (1954) repealed
Pub. L. 93-197 (1973) (Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin in 1970); 25 U.S.C. §§
931-38 (1959) (Catawba Tribe in 1970); 25 U.S.C. §§ 971-80 (1962) (Ponca Tribe
of Native Americans of Nebraska in 1970).
37" Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 388 F.2d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 1964).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 623.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (1970) repealed Pub.
L. 9 3-19 7 (1973).
43- State v. Sanipaw, 21 Wis. 2d 377, 124 N.W.2d 41, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 991
(1964).
44. Id. at 42.
45. Id. at 46.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.2d 998, 184 Ct. Cl. 813 (1967).
49. Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (1954) repealed Pub.
L. 9 3-197 (1973).
50. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.2d 998, 1009-1010, 184 Ct. Cl. 813
(1967).
51. Id. at iooo.
52. Id. at 1002-3003, citing Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 139 F. Supp. 634
(D. Ore. 1956).
53. State v. Sanipav, 21 Wis. 2d 377, 124 N.W.2d 41, cert. denied, 377 U.S.
991 (1964).
54. Meominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.2d 998, 1oo9 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
55" Id. at 1oo5.
56. 25 U.S.C. § 896 (1970).
57. Id.
58. Kiamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 139 F. Supp. 634 (D. Ore. 1956).
59. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.2d 998, LO07, 184 Ct. Cl. 813, 82i
(1967).
6o. lo Stat. 1o65, art. 2, Treaty of Wolf River (1854).
61. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.zd 998, loo9, 184 Ct. Cl. 813, 823
(1967).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1oo.
64. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 389 U.S. 811, cert. granted, 391 U.S. 404
(1968).
65 . Id., 391 U.S. at 4o6.
66. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
67. Id. at 380-81.
68. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 389 U.S. 811, cert. granted, 391 U.S. 404,
410-11 (1968).
69. Id. at 411.
70. Id.
71. Id.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1976
72. Id. at 412.
73- Id.
74. Id.
75. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-67 (1902).
76. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 389 U.S. 811, cert. granted, 391 U.S. 404,
413 (1968); Pidgeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 16o (1930). See also
Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
77- 389 U.S. 811, cert. granted, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
78. Id.
79. State v. Bojorcas, 14 Ore. App. 446, 513 P.zd 813, 814 (1973). See Klamath
& Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 338 F.2d. 620 (9 th Cir. 1964), for an explanation of the
withdrawal by the Klamaths from tribal status. The trust situation existed up until
1974 when the trust was dissolved and final payment was made to those who had
refused to withdraw some 2o years earlier. See also Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. United
States, 436 F.2d 1oo8, 93 Ct. Cl. 67, cert. denied sub. nom., Anderson v. United States,
404 U.S. 950 (1971), for further elaboration of the termination process.
8o. State v. Bojorcas, 14 Ore. App. 446, 513 P.2d 813 (1973).
81. 389 U.S. 811, cert. granted, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84- State v. Borjorcas, 14 Ore. App. 446, 513 P.zd 813, 814 (1973).
85. Id., 513 P.2d at 815.
86. Id.
87. State v. Bojorcas, 14 Ore. App. 538, 514 P.2d 566, 567 (1973).
88. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564 (9 th Cir. 1974).
89. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 389 U.S. 811, cert. granted, 391 U.S. 404
(1968).
9o . 16 Stat. 707 (1864); 25 U.S.C. § 564 (1954).
91. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 566 ( 9th Cir. 1974).
92. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 389 U.S. 811, cert. granted, 391 U.S. 404
(1968).
93- Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 566 (9 th Cir. 1974).
94. Id.
95. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 389 U.S. 811, cert. granted, 391 U.S. 404
(1968).
96. State v. Sanipaw, zi Wis. 2d 377, 124 N.W.2d 41, cert. denied, 377 U.S.
991 (1964)-
97. 139 F. Snpp. 634, 637 (D. Ore. 1956).
98. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 566 ( 9th Cir. 1974).
99. Id.
1oo. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 389 U.S. 811, cert. granted, 391 U.S. 404
(L968).
101. 25 U.S.C. § 564 d(z) (1954).
102. 25 U.S.C. § 894 (1970).
L03. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 568 (9 th Cir. 1974).
104. 389 U.S. 811, cert. granted, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
305. Id.
1o6. Id., 391 U.S. at 431.
107. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 568-69 (9 th Cir. 1974). S. 2745 and
H.R. 7320, at 354-55- See Joint Hearings of the Subcomm's. of the Comm's. on Interior
6 Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4 (1954).
132
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol4/iss1/9
108. 2-5 U.S.C. § 564e(c) (1970).
1o9. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 4113 U.S. 164, 381 (1973); Kimball
v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 3974); Maison v. Sams, 5 F.zd 255, 258
(D.C. Wash. 1925).
110. 338 F.2d 620 (g9th Cir. 1964).
111. Id.
112. 25 U.S.C. § 564 m(b) (1970).
113. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1974).
114. Id. at 559-60.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1976
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol4/iss1/9
